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PREMESSA
Questo fascicolo degli Incontri di filologia classica presenta una sezione tema-
tica in cui sono raccolte le relazioni discusse in occasione del seminario internazio-
nale Etymology and Literary Culture in Greco-Roman Antiquity, organizzato da 
Gianfranco Agosti e Athanassios Vergados presso la School of History, Classics and 
Archaeology dell’Università di Newcastle il 16-17 dicembre 2019, insieme con altri 





The origins of law coincide with the origins of langua-
ge, as both Plato and Horace highlight. Thus, a syste-
matic attempt to discover the etymological roots of 
words simultaneously reveals the source of legality. The 
article examines the etymological doctrina (‘learning’) 
of poets vis-à-vis the etymological reasoning of learned 
jurists. The Twelve Tables, Catullus, and Labeo engage 
in similar etymological pursuits. Ovid’s Byblis respon-
ds to Labeo’s etymologies. The jurist Ulpian echoes the 
poetics of Latin love elegy. Lawyers and poets meet on 
the common ground of etymology in their attempts to 
lay down the law.
Le origini del diritto coincidono con quelle del linguag-
gio, come evidenziano sia Platone sia Orazio: ne con-
segue che scoprire le radici delle parole rivela simulta-
neamente le origini del diritto. Proprio su questa base 
comune l’articolo mette a confronto la dottrina dei poeti 
e la riflessione dei giuristi eruditi, mostrando che attivi-
tà etimologiche affini si riscontrano nelle Dodici Tavole, 
in Catullo e in Labeone; alle etimologie di ques’ultimo 
risponde il Byblis di Ovidio; il giurista Ulpiano, a sua 
volta, riecheggia la poetica dell’elegia d’amore latina. 
Avvocati e poeti, nel loro tentativo di stabilire la legge, 
si incontrano sul terreno comune dell’etimologia.
The study and practice of etymologizing (ancient and modern) inevitably pro-
duces a set of rules that need to be followed in order to uncover the origins and 
true meaning of words. Every linguist needs a lex etymologica, an etymological 
law. The word lex (‘law’) has a technical and non-technical meaning: lex can refer 
to ‘statutes’ or ‘the laws of the state’ (technical meaning), but it can also refer to a 
‘rule’, which is not technically the law in a strictly legal sense. Varro, for instance, 
in De lingua Latina VII 18 refers to ‘poetic law’ lege poetica, which, in this pas-
sage, is more about poetic licence. Poets, Varro says, are allowed to describe the 
whole (Aetolia) by referring to one part (Calydon) (Varro here describes what we 
call pars pro toto). Language, and poetic language in particular, follows specific 
rules or laws. More to the point, Varro explicitly compares the linguistic with the 
legal system in De lingua Latina IX 20 (an non saepe ueteres leges abrogatae nouis 
cedunt? ‘Aren’t old laws often repealed and replaced by old laws?)1. Varro is here 
discussing a variety of linguistic changes, including vocabulary and morphology, 
to illustrate historical change. A new word is legitimate and should be accepted, if 
it has been introduced according to a ratio (‘reasoning’ LL IX 20), a key term for 
both jurists and linguists in their aims to provide principles that govern linguistic 
or legal phenomena.  
  * Many thanks to Athanassios Vergados and Gianfranco Agosti for inviting me to the 
conference. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive feedback.  
1 On this passage, see Duso 2017, 163-164; De Melo 2019, 1117. Translations are from 
the Loeb editions, often modified. 
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The interplay between the technical and non-technical meaning of lex can be a 
source of poetic inspiration. Horace’s Satire II 1 revolves around this ambiguity. 
In this poem, Horace consults the famous jurist Trebatius Testa about the legal 
issue of writing satire, a genre in which freedom of speech is an indispensable re-
quirement. While Horace uses the word lex to discuss the rules of the satiric genre, 
Trebatius is concerned about poetry which may break the law. As Michèle Lowrie 
puts it, the law in question has nothing to do with the legal sphere, but is the law of 
the genre. Roman law and the conventions of Latin poetry here intersect2.
There is a similar interplay in the practice of etymologizing, an interplay be-
tween the linguistic rules of discovering the true meaning of words and the rea-
soning of Roman jurists. Etymologizing and legal reasoning may have more in 
common than it appears at first sight. The law is a discourse and thus language 
is its prerequisite. The birth of the legal system coincides with the origins of lan-
guage, as in Horace’s brief history of the beginnings of human civilization (Hor-
ace, Satire I 3,99-106): 
Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris
mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter
unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
pugnabant armis, quae post fabricauerat usus,
donec uerba, quibus uoces sensusque notarent,
nominaque inuenere; dehinc absistere bello,
oppida coeperunt munire et ponere leges,
ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.
When living creatures crawled forth upon primeval earth, 
dumb, shapeless beasts, they fought for their acorns and lairs 
with nails and fists, then with clubs, and so on step by step with 
the weapons which need had later forged, until they found 
words and names wherewith to give meaning to their cries 
and feelings. Thenceforth, they began to cease from war, to 
build towns, and to lay down laws that none should be a thief 
or bandit or adulterer.
Language makes possible the transition from violence to justice or from animal 
brutality to human civilization. Once men have words to describe a ‘thief’ or an 
‘adulterer’, they have the power to define a crime and punish the culprits. The ‘in-
vention of names’ (inuenere nomina) results in the creation of a legal code. Thus, 
to discover the origins of words is to discover the foundations of the rule of law.
2 See Lowrie 2005, 407.
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In Plato’s Cratylus, the lawgiver is essentially a namegiver, as in the following 
passage (Plato, Cratylus 389a):
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρός, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ὄνομα θέσθαι, ἀλλά 
τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ· οὗτος δ᾿ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν 
δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.
ΕΡΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ. Ἔοικεν.
ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, ἐπίσκεψαι ποῖ βλέπων ὁ νομοθέτης τὰ ὀνόματα τίθεται.
Socrates: Then it is not for every man, Hermogenes, to give names, but for 
him who may be called the name-maker; and he, it appears, is the lawgiver, 
who is of all the artisans among men the rarest.
Hermogenes: So it appears.
Socrates: See now what the lawgiver has in view in giving names. 
In order to find out the etymology of words, Socrates and Hermogenes will be 
trying to discover the intention of the lawgiver throughout Plato’s dialogue. In 
a masterful touch, Socrates here subtly etymologizes the word νομοθέτης from 
ὄνομα θέσθαι. The semantic relation between ὄνομα and ὁ νομοθέτης is one of 
the dialogue’s recurring motifs (cf. 431e ὁ νομοθέτης ἦν ὄνομα; 427c ὄνομα ποιῶν 
ὁ νομοθέτης). To give a name (ὄνομα) is to create the law (ὁ νόμος). Socrates’ 
etymological link lies behind Horace’s transition from finding names (nominaque 
inuenere) to laying down the law (ponere leges).
Given the close links between the invention of names and laws, the Roman ju-
rists’ obsession with etymologies and the true meanings of words is not surprising3. 
Naming is a normative speech act and that is why it has the force of law. And that 
is why the art of etymologizing was not a tangential interest or a hobby horse of the 
Roman jurists, but an integral part of juristic reasoning and the education of a law-
yer. The practice of coming up with the rules of etymologizing developed in parallel 
and in dialogue with etymologizing as a way of laying down the law. To discover 
the original meaning of words was to discover the intentions of the first lawgiver. 
Etymologizing in the Roman world is often discussed in the context of ancient 
grammarians, antiquarians, and philosophers4. But it is rarely examined in the con-
text of Roman jurisprudence, despite its prominence in legal reasoning and educa-
tion. Why is this the case? One reason may be that literary scholars interested in an-
cient etymologies are more familiar with and more interested in ancient linguistic 
theories than with the world of Roman law. This may be one, but not the only rea-
3 Ceci 1892 is a book length study of the etymologies of the Roman jurists. 
4 See, for instance, Blank 2008; De Melo 2019.
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son– I think there are at least two more. From a modern perspective, the school of 
linguistics and the law school belong to different parts of the campus and have very 
little, if anything, to do with each other. When we think about etymologies, we may 
be forgiven not to think about the curriculum of law schools in the Roman world. 
Another reason is the older view that the independence of Roman jurispru-
dence meant that the world of Roman law was culturally isolated5. Scholars re-
cently argued against the traditional approach that divorces Roman jurists from 
their socio-historical context6. The jurists were in constant dialogue both with 
intellectual traditions and with changing social values and pressures. Grammar, 
myth, and poetry played a vital role in their legal reasoning. As Jill Harries puts 
it, «Lawyers, philosophers, grammarians, historians and men of general culture 
could meet on the common ground of etymology»7.  
The Augustan jurist M. Antistius Labeo is a good case study. Labeo founded a 
renowned school of law that emphasized the study of liberal arts. Semantics, dia-
lectics, literary criticism, and etymological analyses were keys to interpreting the 
law in Labeo’s school8. Aulus Gellius introduces Antistius Labeo by referring to 
his expertise in dialectic, literature, and the derivations of words (XIII 10):
Quid ‘sororis’ ἔτυμον esse dixerit Labeo Antistius, et quid ‘fratris’ P. Nigidius.
Labeo Antistius iuris quidem ciuilis disciplinam principali studio exercuit 
et consulentibus de iure publice responsitauit; ceterarum quoque bonarum 
artium non expers fuit et in grammaticam sese atque dialecticam litterasque 
antiquiores altioresque penetrauerat Latinarumque uocum origines ra-
tionesque percalluerat, eaque praecipue scientia ad enodandos plerosque 
iuris laqueos utebatur. Sunt adeo libri post mortem eius editi, qui Poste-
riores  inscribuntur, quorum librorum tres continui, tricesimus octauus et 
tricesimus nonus et quadragesimus, pleni sunt id genus rerum ad enarran-
dam et inlustrandam linguam Latinam conducentium. Praeterea in libris 
5 Interestingly, the view that law is an independent discourse virtually divorced from its 
sociopolitical context, parallels Saussurian linguistics. The absolute autonomy of the jurid-
ical form is similar to grammatical rules of morphology that are internally regulated and 
evolve independently. The pure theory of law, which constructs a body of doctrines and 
rules totally independent of social constraints and pressures, resembles Saussure’s pure 
theory of language, which excludes historical and social conditions from governing the 
functioning of language and its transformations. See Bourdieu 1987, 814. 
6 As Harries 2006, 12 puts it, the present separation of legal discourse from the rest is 
not reflected in the intellectual approach taken by the Roman elite. See also Howley 2013; 
Wibier (forthcoming).
7 See Harries 2017, 105.
8 See Bauman 1989, 47-48.
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quos Ad Praetoris Edictum scripsit multa posuit, partim lepide atque argute 
reperta. Sicuti hoc est quod in quarto Ad Edictum libro scriptum legimus: 
«‘Soror’» inquit «appellata est, quod quasi seorsum nascitur separatur-
que ab ea domo in qua nata est et in aliam familiam transgreditur». ‘Fra-
tris’ autem vocabulum P. Nigidius, homo inpense doctus, non minus arguto 
subtilique ἐτύμῳ interpretatur: «‘Frater’» inquit «est dictus quasi ‘fere alter’».
The derivation of soror, according to Antistius Labeo, and that of frater, ac-
cording to Publius Nigidius.
Antistius Labeo cultivated the study of civil law with special interest, and gave 
advice publicly to those who consulted him on legal questions; he was also not 
unacquainted with the other liberal arts, and he had delved deep into grammar 
and dialectics, as well as into the earlier and more recondite literature. He had 
also become versed in the origin and formation of Latin words, and applied 
that knowledge in particular to solving many knotty points of law. In fact, 
after his death works of his were published, which are entitled Posteriores, of 
which three successive books, the thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth and fortieth, are 
full of information of that kind, tending to explain and illustrate the Latin 
language. Moreover, in the books which he wrote On the Praetor’s Edict he has 
included many observations, some of which are graceful and clever. Of such 
a kind is this, which we find written in the fourth book On the Edict: «A so-
ror, or ‘sister’» he says «is so called because she is, as it were, born seorsum, 
or ‘outside,’ and is separated from that home in which she was born, and 
transferred to another family». Moreover, Publius Nigidius, a man of prodi-
gious learning, explains the word frater, or ‘brother’, by a no less clever and in-
genious derivation: «A frater» he says «is so called because he is, as it were, fere 
alter, that is, ‘almost another self’».
Labeo’s etymology of soror gives Gellius the opportunity to introduce the work of 
the renowned Augustan jurist. The jurist Labeo and Nigidius Figulus9, a scholar 
as learned as Varro, as Gellius puts it (NA IV 9,1), appear in the same context and 
address similar issues, namely the origins of commonly used words. In Gellius, 
there seems to be no firewall separating the linguist from the jurist. In fact, Gellius 
(NA XVII 7) says that Nigidius Figulus discussed the ambiguities of the lex Atinia 
in his Grammatical Notes10. The legal issue of whether the law that forbids usucap-
ion of stolen property is prospective or retrospective hinges upon the grammatical 
interpretation of subruptum erit (does it indicate both past and future?). Figulus’ 
linguistic expertise is thus indispensable to the interpretation of the law.  
Similarly, Labeo’s foray into etymological derivations is not distinguished from 
9 On Nigidius Figulus, see Volk 2016, 45-49; Garcea 2019.
10 See Garcea 2019, 94.
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his legal expertise. The deep knowledge of etymologies is applied to solving the 
knotty points of law. Note how in the passage quoted above origines and rationes 
appear as a pair. While origo can mean etymology, ratio is the term that describes 
the reasoning of a jurist. Only in this context etymological and juristic analysis are 
united. In other words, etymological research is not the leisurely activity of a learned 
antiquarian, but is directly related to the origins of legality. The origins of words re-
veal the true nature of the law. Etymological and legal interpretation overlap. 
Labeo’s etymology of soror is a comment on an edict. While the details of this 
edict are unclear, it is likely that the etymology appears in the context of discussing 
family or marriage law. A sister, for Labeo, is someone who is separated from her 
home, because she marries into another family. It is possible that Labeo brings up 
this etymology, in order to point out that the very origin of the word soror encap-
sulates the incest taboo. A sister has to marry outside the family. This is what the 
word actually means. We may not know how close or far from the context this 
interpretation is, but we can be fairly certain that Labeo’s etymology is a jurist’s 
interpretation of the law.
Jurists were interested in the origins of words because etymologizing is often a 
way of discussing the link between the signifier and the signified11. Are names ar-
bitrary conventions that have little, if anything, to do with entities they refer to or 
do signifiers reveal the truth about the nature of the entities they name? Is there a 
link between language and nature or not? It is not hard to see why these linguistic 
issues are relevant to legal theory and practice. What is law’s relationship to na-
ture? Is it a human convention or does it spring from a divine or natural source? 
The lawgiver (νομοθέτης) and the namegiver (ὀνοματοθέτης) are the origins of 
the debate about the relationship between the signifier (name or law) and the nat-
ural order. To give a name is to lay down the law. This law may be a custom or a 
convention, but it may be more than that; it may be the reflection of the rule of 
nature in the medium of human language.  
In the passage from Gellius quoted above, the antiquarian Nigidius Figulus ap-
pears in the same context as the jurist Labeo. Figulus saw the meaning of the words 
not as human conventions, but as natural12. Etymology thus unlocks the truth of 
the universe13. It is not a big step to see why this approach would be appealing 
11 On the intricate relationship between the signifier and the signified in ancient ety-
mologizing, see now Vergados 2020.
12 On Figulus’ naturalism, see Garcea 2019. On language and nature in the Roman 
world, see Pezzini and Taylor 2019. 
13 Lucretius’ De rerum natura equates the nature of the universe with nature’s general law 
(see Garani 2014, 130). Schiesaro 2007 argues that it was part of juristic discourse to construct 
a legal model for the universe. The first attested example of this practice is Lucretius. 
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to jurists. The law’s authority is significantly boosted, if it does not appear as an 
arbitrary convention but as a projection of the universal laws of nature. From that 
perspective, Labeo’s etymology of soror would not be a purely linguistic sugges-
tion, but would contribute to an argument according to which incest is unnatural. 
The legality of incest is hotly debated in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Byblis, who 
falls in love with her brother Caunus, and Myrrha, who falls in love with her father 
Cinyras, employ forensic rhetoric and allude to philosophical views (mainly Stoic) 
that justify incestuous liaisons14. Both heroines attempt to erase the family names 
(brother and sister, father and daughter) that signify the prohibition of incest. 
The name is the embodiment of the incest taboo. Ovid tells us that Byblis called 
Caunus master; she hated the name of brother and preferred to be called Byblis 
rather than sister (Metamorphoses IX 465-466 iam dominum appellat, iam nomi-
na sanguinis odit / Byblida iam mauult quam se uocet ille sororem).
The name is the law (ὄνομα νόμος) that prohibits Byblis and Caunus to be 
joined in love. At the beginning of her letter, Byblis first writes and then erases 
soror (Met. IX 528) in an attempt to eradicate the incest taboo. She confesses that 
she is ashamed to spell out her name (531 pudet edere nomen) and wishes she 
could plead her cause without a name (532-533 sine nomine uellem / posset agi 
mea causa meo). The diction (agi mea causa) describes a legal procedure. Byblis 
imagines that she is pleading her case in a court of love. In this forensic setting, 
the very name of sister would imply that she is breaking the law. In this case, the 
repeated use of nomen brings up the close relationship between the name and the 
norm. What is more, nomen is an etymological marker in Latin poetry15. Just as 
she first writes and then erases the name of soror, Byblis first refers to and then 
rejects its etymology in the juristic tradition (Metamorphoses IX 487):
si liceat mutato nomine iungi 
If only I could change my name and be joined to you
The change of name would mean that Byblis will be free from the etymological as-
sociation of soror with separation from her family. For Labeo, a sister is someone 
who is separated from the home she was born in. But if the name changes, then 
Byblis will be able to be united with her brother. The infinitive iungi right after the 
change of the name alludes to this etymological connection.  
Byblis’ forensic rhetoric becomes gradually more aggressive. In her letter to 
14 On Myrrha’s and Byblis’ legal arguments, see Gebhardt 2009, 321-334. On Myrrha 
and laws against incest, see also Ziogas 2021, 346-383. 
15 See Maltby 1993, 257, 260; Cairns 1996, 29-31.
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Caunus, she argues that both the desires of the young and the practice of the gods 
do not prohibit incest (Metamorphoses IX 548-555):
        non hoc inimica precatur,
sed quae, cum tibi sit iunctissima, iunctior esse
expetit et uinclo tecum propiore ligari.
iura senes norint, et quid liceatque nefasque
fasque sit, inquirant, legumque examina seruent.
conueniens Venus est annis temeraria nostris.
quid liceat, nescimus adhuc, et cuncta licere
credimus, et sequimur magnorum exempla deorum
It is no enemy who prays to you, but one who, though most 
closely joined to you, seeks to be more fully joined and to 
be bound by a still closer tie. Let old men know the laws and 
talk of what is fitting, what is right and wrong, and preserve 
the nice discrimination of the laws. But love is compliant 
and heedless for those of our age. What is allowed we have 
not yet discovered, and we believe all things allowed; and in 
this we do but follow the example of the great gods.
The main issue here is what is permitted and what is forbidden in love. The legality 
of a sister’s passion for her brother is what Byblis is arguing for. She avoids the use 
of the word soror and points out that she is not inimica. The opposite of inimica is 
amica (‘girlfriend, mistress’) and this is precisely what Byblis would like to be in 
relation to Caunus16. Having already replaced frater with dominus, Byblis imagi-
nes her affair with her brother in elegiac terms. The code of the genre of Latin love 
elegy has the power to overrule the incest taboo. 
Once the name soror has been subtly replaced by amica, Byblis creates a cluster 
of words that refer to bonding (iunctissima, iunctior, uincla, ligari). The besotted 
heroine argues that a sister is tightly joined to her brother and thus rejects Labeo’s 
etymology. Note that Byblis specifically dismisses those who are learned in the law 
and examine what is right and wrong. She is clearly referring to the iurisperiti, 
learned jurists like Labeo, whose etymology of soror supports the prohibition of in-
cest. Etymologies thus become a vital part in forensic rhetoric and juristic reason-
ing. What is permitted and what is forbidden is defined by means of etymologizing. 
16 Cicero employs the inimica-amica wordplay in his attack on Clodia; see Pro Caelio 32 
nec enim muliebris umquam inimicitias mihi gerendas putaui, praesertim cum ea quam omnes 
semper amicam omnium potius quam cuiusquam inimicam putauerunt, «For indeed I never 
thought that I should have to engage in quarrels with women, still less with a woman whom 
everyone has always thought to be everyone’s (girl)friend rather than anyone’s enemy».
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While rejecting Labeo’s etymology, Byblis draws attention to alternative ety-
mological links. The language of bondage refers to the etymology of Venus from 
uincire (‘to bind’)17. This etymology features prominently in Latin love elegy18 and 
in Ovid’s Metamorphoses19. Byblis appeals to the generic code of Latin love elegy 
in order to replace the legalism of old jurists20. In fact, Propertius suggests the ety-
mology of Venus from uincire in a passage that conflates the bonds of elegiac love 
with contractual bonds and marriage legislation (III 20,15-25)21. 
Binding is a distinctive characteristic of both law and love in Latin elegy22. The 
law has the power to bind its subjects in knots. In the passage from Gellius quoted 
above, Labeo is said to have used his knowledge of the origins of words «to solve 
many knotty points of law» (ad enodandos  plerosque iuris laqueos utebatur)23. 
Now Byblis argues that erotic bonds have the force of law and thus can legitimize 
incest. Her reference to the Venus-uinclum-uincire etymological nexus suggests 
the power of erotic desire to break old legal bonds and create new ones. This adds 
another dimension to the well-established etymological link between Venus and 
uincire. The bonds of Venus have the force of legal bonds. Byblis’ aim is to restore 
what Peter Goodrich calls the ‘law of first Venus’24 and her etymological referenc-
es should be interpreted in the context of her revisionist legal arguments. 
Besides the Venus-uincire semantic link, Byblis alludes to the etymology of Ve-
nus from uenire25. Ovid is fond of this etymology26 and Byblis’ conueniens Venus 
is a particularly suitable etymological allusion in this context. Unrestrained love 
17 This etymology is already implied in Plautus, Trin. 658 ita ui Veneris uinctus («thus 
bound by Venus’ force»). See also Varro, LL V 61-62 et mas ignis, quod ibi semen, aqua 
femina, quod fetus ab eius humore, et horum  uinctionis  uis  Venus. Hinc comicus: “huic 
uictrix Venus, uidesne haec?” Non quod uincere uelit Venus, sed uincire («and fire is male, 
which the semen is in the other case, and water is female, because the embryo develops 
from her moisture, and the force that brings their “binding” is Venus. Hence the comic 
poet says, “huic Venus victrix …” – not because Venus wishes [or signifies] ‘to conquer’, 
but ‘to bind’» (transl. Hinds 2006). On this etymological connection, see Hinds 2006. 
18 See Propertius III 24,13-14 and 20,19-23 with Hinds 2006.
19 See Met. IV 182-184 with Michalopoulos 2001, 169.
20 The recusatio of legalism for the sake of the novel laws of love is a distinctive charac-
teristic of Latin love elegy; see Ziogas 2021, 27-68. 
21 See Keith 2008, 41-42; Gebhardt 2009, 139-141.
22 See Ziogas 2021, 155-162.
23 Cicero describes etymologizing in similar terms in De natura deorum III 62 in enon-
danis autem nominibus. 
24 See Goodrich 2006, 6-16.
25 On this etymology, see Maltby 1991, 635; Michalopoulos 2001, 169-170; Hinds 2006. 
26 See Michalopoulos 2001, 169-170.
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befits the young to whom everything is permitted. Byblis here uses Venus both as 
a metonymy for sex and as the name of the anthropomorphic goddess. Venus was 
married to her brother Vulcan, had an adulterous affair with her brother Mars, 
and a child with her brother Mercury27. Like a good jurist, Byblis here refers to 
divine precedent (the exempla of gods’ incestuous marital and extramarital affairs) 
to justify and legalize her love for her brother. Her etymological wordplay is part 
and parcel of her forensic rhetoric and legal reasoning, and is thus employed to 
solve a particularly knotty point of law. 
Redefining the meaning of words is how Ovid’s heroines attempt to justify 
their incestuous desires. Byblis, Myrrha, and Phaedra attempt to cast pietas (‘fami-
ly duty’) as synonymous to amor (‘erotic desire’). Semantic shifts re-evaluate what 
is forbidden and what is permitted. Not unlike Byblis, Phaedra, in her love letter to 
her stepson Hippolytus, distinguishes old from new customs and refers to Jupiter 
as the divine precedent that legitimates incest (Heroides 4,131-134):
ista uetus pietas, aeuo moritura futuro,
rustica Saturno regna tenente fuit.
Iuppiter esse pium statuit, quodcumque iuuaret,
et fas omne facit fratre marita soror.
Such old-fashioned piety, about to die in the age to come, was 
rustic even in Saturn’s reign. Jupiter decreed that whatever 
brought pleasure was pious, and a sister married to a brother 
makes everything lawful.
Jupiter, the father god of justice, redefines pietas by marrying his sister. Iuppiter 
statuit implies that Jupiter lays down the law by means of giving pietas a new 
meaning. The verb statuere has a legal meaning; it describes the authoritative rul-
ing of a jurist or a judge28. Once more, there is an etymological allusion in the 
context of legitimizing incest. Iuppiter… iuuaret frames the hexameter and points 
to the etymological connection of these words29. The etymology is at least as old 
as Ennius (see Varro, LL V 65) and features in Cicero’s De natura deorum II 64 
(Iuppiter – id est iuuans pater quem conuersis casibus appellamus a iuuando Iouem 
«Jupiter – the name means ‘the helping father,’ whom with a change of inflexion 
27 In Hesiod’s Theogony, Aphrodite is born from the foam/semen of Ouranos’ severed 
genitals, but in Homer’s Iliad she is the daughter of Zeus. Ovid follows both the Hesiodic 
(e.g., Met. IV 536-538) and the Homeric traditions (e.g., Met. XV 807-808).
28 Cf. Gebhardt 2009, 52.
29 For the framing of a line as an etymological marker, see O’Hara 2017, 82-86.
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we style Jove, from iuuare ‘to help’»)30. Ovid is fully aware of this etymological 
link. In the Amores, for instance, Ovid’s girlfriend shuts him out and the poet 
realizes that Jupiter’s epic thunderbolt cannot help him to unbolt Corinna’s door 
(Amores II 1,19-20): 
 Iuppiter, ignoscas: nil me tua tela iuuabant:
clausa tuo maius ianua fulmen habet.
Jupiter, forgive me: your weapons could not help me: the 
closed door has a bolt greater than yours.
Latin love elegy is not only a disavowal of epic, but also a rejection of Jupiter’s 
etymological connection with iuuare31. The supreme god and the symbol of epic 
grauitas cannot help the elegiac lover in his time of need. 
While the Iuppiter-iuuare etymological link is well established, in Heroides 
4,133 it involves a striking semantic shift. In the etymological explanations of Jupi-
ter’s name, iuuare means to ‘help, to assist’ (see Ovid, Her. 11,17-18; Pont. II 1,13 
and 9,24-25), but in Phaedra’s version of this etymology, it means ‘to give pleasure, 
delight’. Phaedra both refers to a traditional etymology and gives a surprising twist 
to it. Once an etymological connection between two words is established, the game 
of coming up with various explanations begins. Phaedra combines her radical re-
definition of pietas with her new interpretation of Jupiter’s traditional etymology 
from iuuare. Semantic shifts change the nature of the law. The origins of words 
take us back to the birth of the law. Phaedra’s etymologizing is a case in point. As 
the father of gods and men, Jupiter is the divine symbol of sovereignty. The name 
of the father stands for the prohibition of incest in Lacanian psychoanalysis32, but 
Phaedra resorts to etymological wordplay in order to argue exactly the opposite, 
namely that Jupiter’s name means that the father allows whatever is pleasing and 
sanctions incest by marrying his sister. Phaedra’s redefinition of pietas and Iup-
piter may strike us as perverse, but she may actually have something important 
to say about the origins of sovereignty. As Micaela Janan argues in her perceptive 
reading of Propertius IV 11, juridical reasoning comes to rest in the logical opacity 
of desire: something is made into law, because «it is the will of [the gods, Nature, 
30 See McKeown 1987, 49; Maltby 1991, 319; Michalopoulos 2001, 102-103.
31 Cf. Met. I 274-275 with Michalopoulos 2001, 102. Here iuuare is transferred from 
Jupiter to Neptune.
32 Lacan famously puns on nom (‘name’) and non (‘no’) in le nom du père. The name of 
the father signifies the prohibition of incest. 
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emperor, people, senate]»33. The desire of the sovereign legislator is the ultimate 
source of legality. The Romans were fully aware that the law is grounded on what-
ever pleases the sovereign legislative body. The legislative formula senatui/principi 
placuit (‘it pleased the senate/prince’) is in line with Phaedra’s argument. Whatever 
pleases the sovereign legislator has the force of law. By interpreting the origins of 
Jupiter’s name, Phaedra argues that the sovereign’s desire is the source of legality. 
Etymologizing in Latin poetry is commonly discussed in the context of the po-
et’s doctrina (‘learning’). James McKeown’s compelling and influential discussion 
of etymology in Ovid’s Amores, for instance, is part of his section on doctrina34. 
This doctrina is often related to the Alexandrian poetics of Latin poetry35. But note 
that doctus commonly describes a learned jurist. As Kathleen Coleman points out, 
doctus is the uox propria of a ‘learned jurisconsult’36. Coleman makes this point in 
discussing Ovid’s Tiresias in Metamorphoses III 322-323. Building on Coleman, 
Kathryn Balsley argues that Ovid brings together prophetic, poetic, and juristic 
discourse in an era that signals the emergence of the science of law37. The doctrina 
of the uates (‘seer, poet’) reflects the learning of the iurisperitus38. Etymological 
learning in Latin poetry should be examined in this context. Etymological doctri-
na is related to the poet’s legal studies and to an educational tradition in which a 
learned lawyer needs to know about the origins of words. In other words, etymol-
ogizing is a means of establishing poetic and legal authority. 
As we have already seen, the jurist Labeo is an eminent representative of a legal 
tradition from which many poetic etymologies derive39. For instance, the jurist ety-
mologized furtum from furuus, a rare word that means ‘swarthy’ (Digest XLVII 2,1):
furtum a furuo, id est nigro dictum Labeo ait, quod clam et obscuro fiat et 
plerumque nocte 
‘theft’ derives from ‘swarthy’, which Labeo says means ‘black’, because it 
occurs secretly and in darkness and mostly at night.
Labeo etymologizes a term that concerns the law: ‘theft.’ The obscure word furuus 
reflects the darkness of theft. This is not only a subtle and self-reflexive comment 
33 See Janan 2001, 146-163.
34 See McKeown 1987, 45-62. 
35 See O’Hara 2017.
36 See Coleman 1990.
37 See Balsley 2010.
38 See Ziogas 2021, 245-300.
39 See Cairns 1991, 444; cf. Howley 2013, 14-16.
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worthy of a poet, but also highlights the interplay between signifier and signified. In 
fact, the semantic relation between nox and furtum is already attested in the Twelve 
Tables (8,12 si nox furtum factum sit, si im occidit, iure caesus esto, «if theft has been 
committed at night, if owner kills him, thief shall be held lawfully killed»). Macrobi-
us (Saturnalia I 4,19) cites this passage from the Twelve Tables in order to comment 
on the unusual use of nox for noctu, but what looks like the nominative case of 
nox may draw attention to the semantic relation between nox and furtum: theft has 
become (factum est) synonymous to night. The emphatic nox further suggests an 
etymological link with noxa (‘wrongdoing’) and nocere (‘to harm’)40. Nightly theft is 
a crime (noxa) that will harm (nocet) the thief, if he is caught in the act.   
The semantic relation between furtum and nox is not restricted to legal texts, 
but features prominently in Latin love poetry. We can find traces of this derivation 
in Catullus (68, 145-146):
sed furtiua dedit muta munuscula nocte, 
ipsius ex ipso dempta uiri gremio.
but she gave me in the silent night stolen gifts, taken from the 
very bosom of her husband himself.
The stolen gifts here occur at night, an allusion to the etymology of furtum from 
furuus. Note also the legal background of this wordplay. The learned etymological 
allusion appears in a context that describes adultery in terms of property theft. 
This legal context may point to the origins of this etymology in legal discourse. 
The extramarital love affair is a theft and that is why it takes place at night. By 
pointing out that furta take place in the darkness of the night, Catullus alludes to 
an etymology that Labeo spells out (7,7-8): 
aut quam sidera multa, cum tacet nox, 
furtiuos hominum uident amores
or as many as are the stars, when night is silent, that see the 
stolen loves of men
The stars here are the eyewitnesses of thefts committed by lovers at night. Ovid 
alludes to this etymology several times; in Amores I 11, the expert (2 docta) hair-
dresser Nape is known for her secret services (3-4):
40 On these etymological links, see Varro, De lingua Latina VI 6 quod nocet nox with 
Maltby 1991, s.v nox, noxa.  
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inque ministeriis furtiuae congita noctis
utilis et dandis ingeniosa notis
 
[Nape], known for useful ministry in the stealthy night and 
skilled in the giving of the signal
Note also the wordplay noctis/notis highlighted by the position of the words in the 
end of two consecutive lines. Here nota functions as an etymological marker (cf. 
Fasti IV 61 notatum, discussed below); the secret signals that Nape communicates 
draw attention to the semantic link between furtiuus and nox. The darkness of 
the night supports the communication of secret signs41. The obscure semantics 
of the learned etymology reflect the secret communication of signals. There is an 
interplay between the literal darkness of the night and the figurative obscurity of 
the etymological derivation of furtum from furuus. From doctus Catullus42 to doc-
tus Labeo and from the learned jurisconsult to the elegiac Ovid, the etymology of 
furtum features prominently in poetic and juristic discourse.  
Poets at times refer explicitly to an etymology (see, e.g., the etymology of Apri-
lis from Aphrodite at Fasti IV 61-62 discussed below), but more often than not 
their etymologizing is a learned allusion that the reader is invited to decipher. This 
is more than just a witty (or even nerdy) game of poets obsessed with recondite 
derivations of words. As we saw in the examples above, etymologizing can have a 
powerful rhetorical effect. Discovering the origins of words boosts the poet’s au-
thority43. Etymological wordplay can be simultaneously traditional and revision-
ist, as in the case of Phaedra’s interpretation of Jupiter’s etymology from iuuare. 
The practice of etymologizing in the juristic tradition is similarly a legitimizing 
force. And not unlike the poets, the jurists’ etymologies can be explicit or implicit. 
The reasonings (rationes) of jurists are often radical and unexpectedly progres-
sive. Like Ovid’s Phaedra, they employ etymology to drive a revolutionary point 
home. Ulpian’s argument that affection legitimates gifts given to both friends and 
prostitutes is a case in point (Digest. XXXIX 5,5):
41 Ovid alludes to the semantic relation between theft and darkness at Her. 19,55-56 Sic 
ubi deceptae pars est mihi maxima noctis / acta, subit furtim lumina fessa sopor, «When 
the greatest part of the night has gone by for me in such delusions, sleep steals upon my 
wearied eyes»; Met. XI 762 Aesacon umbrosa furtim peperisse sub Ida «she secretly gave 
birth to Aesacus under shady Ida».
42 Catullus was known as doctus in Latin literature; see [Tibullus] III 6,4; Ovid, Am. III 
9,62; Martial I 61,1.
43 On wordplay and powerplay in Latin poetry, see Mitsis and Ziogas 2016.
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Affectionis gratia neque honestae neque inhonestae donationes sunt pro-
hibitae, honestae erga bene merentes amicos uel necessarios, inhonestae 
circa meretrices.
When they are made out of affection, neither honourable nor dishonourable 
gifts are prohibited. Honourable gifts are those made to deserving friends 
and relations; dishonourable ones are those made to prostitutes.   
It is extraordinary that honourable and dishonourable affairs fall under the same 
category, provided that affection motivates giving44. It is even more revolution-
ary that affectio, a concept closely related to affectio maritalis, here appears in the 
context of gifts given to prostitutes45. The jurist applies a term which is key to mar-
riage legislation to extramarital affairs, resembling the poetics of Catullus or Ovid. 
The radically different groups of merentes amicos and meretrices come together by 
means of the etymological link between merentes and meretrices. The difference 
between the reciprocal exchanges of amicitia and commodity transactions with 
prostitutes collapses; merentes amici and meretrices/amicae belong to the same cat-
egory. The jurist relies on the semantic range of merere, in order to blur the distinc-
tion between worthy friends and mercenary courtesans, between value and price; 
the verb means «to earn money (by prostitution)» (see OLD mereo 1b) and «to have 
a merit, to deserve» (see OLD mereo 4). By bringing together deserving friends and 
prostitutes, Ulpian subtly implies a radical redefinition of the etymological link be-
tween meretrix and merere. Latin love elegy and juristic discourse may have more 
in common than we think. The etymologies they imply are often uncontroversial, 
but their innovative interpretations may radically change concepts of legality.
In Latin poetry, the origins of words are often discussed in legal contexts. A 
good example is Ovid’s Fasti, a work in which the poet’s interview of divine figures 
often resembles a client’s consultation of a jurist. The pursuit of etymological der-
ivations is embedded in a trial setting. Book V of the Fasti, for instance, features 
three speeches of the Muses, who dispute the etymology of May. Polyhymnia ety-
mologizes Maius from Maiestas, Urania from maiores (‘ancestors’), and Calliope 
from Maia. Ovid plays the role of a judge in this etymological dispute but is unable 
to give a verdict. There is a similar dispute about the etymology of June at the 
beginning of Book VI. In the Fasti, a work whose very title is a reference to legal 
action, the poet repeatedly casts his search for true causes and etymologies as legal 
44 For a discussion of this passage and its similarities with the poetics of Latin love ele-
gy, see Ziogas 2021, 273-275.




disputes. Ulrich Gebhardt argues convincingly that in the Fasti, the search for true 
aetiologies is cast as a legal procedure46.
Building on Gebhardt, I argue that there is a link between etymological search 
and legal procedure or consultation. The quasi-legal disputes of the etymologies 
of May and June at the beginnings of Fasti V and VI are the most prominent 
examples, but the legalistic dimension of etymologizing is both pervasive and un-
derexplored. The etymology of April in Fasti IV is a case in point. While Ovid is 
noncommittal when it comes to pronouncing a judgment about the etymology of 
May and June, he makes clear right from the beginning which etymology of April 
he thinks is correct (61-62):
sed Veneris mensem Graio sermone notatum
auguror: a spumis est dea dicta maris.
But I surmise that the month of Venus took its name from the 
Greek language: the goddess was called after the foam of the sea.
Ovid here says that Aprilis is from Aphrodite, whose name was etymologized 
from ἀφρός. The oldest and most authoritative source of this etymology is Hesiod 
and Ovid’s grandiloquent Graio sermone alludes to the archaic Greek poet47. It is 
remarkable that Ovid presents his etymological explanation here as a performance 
of augury. The name (Aprilis in this case) is a sign (cf. notatum) laden with hid-
den meaning. The poet decodes its semantics by etymologizing it. He dissects its 
constituents and reads its true message. The phrase nomen omen48 suggests that 
discovering the true meanings of words is an act of augury. It is not a coincidence 
that the augurs, the official interpreters of auspices, were tirelessly exploring an-
tiquarian sources and etymologies. This is precisely Ovid’s persona in the Fasti in 
general and in the couplet quoted above in particular. But the augurs were also 
authoritative interpreters of the law49. Quintus Mucius Scaevola Augur (c. 169-
88 BCE), for instance, was a prominent Roman jurist. The name and the law are 
symbols decoded by a learned augur.
46 See Gebhardt 2009, 283-303.
47 For the etymology of Aphrodite from ἀφρός, see Hesiod, Theogony 190-200 (espe-
cially 190-191 ἀμφὶ δὲ λευκὸς / ἀφρὸς ἀπ’ ἀθανάτου χροὸς ὤρνυτο, «a white foam rose 
up around them from the immortal flesh»). See also Cicero, ND III 59. For the ancient 
etymology of Aprilis, see Maltby 1991, 44.
48 The earliest attestation of this wordplay seems to be Plautus, Persa 625 nomen 
atque omen quantiuis iam est preti, «The name and omen are already worth any price». 
Toxilus here etymologizes Lucris from lucrum (‘profit’). 
49 See, e.g., Linderski 1986.
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After justifying his etymological preference, Ovid mentions an alternative ety-
mology, which he ostensibly rejects (Fasti IV 85-94): 
Quo non Liuor abit? sunt qui tibi mensis honorem 
eripuisse uelint inuideantque, Venus. 
nam, quia uer aperit tunc omnia densaque cedit 
frigoris asperitas fetaque terra patet, 
Aprilem memorant ab aperto tempore dictum 
quem Venus iniecta uindicat alma manu. 
illa quidem totum dignissima temperat orbem, 
illa tenet nullo regna minora deo, 
iuraque dat caelo, terrae, natalibus undis, 
perque suos initus continet omne genus
To what extremes does Envy not stray? There are those who 
grudge you the honour of the month, and would snatch it 
from you, Venus. For they say that April was named from the 
open (apertum) season, because spring then opens (aperit) all 
things, and the sharp frost-bound cold departs, and earth un-
locks her teeming soil, though kindly Venus claims the month 
and lays her hand on it. She indeed sways, and well deserves 
to sway, the world entire; she owns a kingdom second to that 
of no god; she gives laws to heaven and earth and to her native 
sea, and by her inspiration she keeps every species in being. 
The presence of Livor in Ovid is often associated with litigation. The most 
prominent example is Amores I 15,1-8, where Livor prosecutes Ovid for being 
sluggish and indifferent to a military or legal career. The mention of Livor in Fasti 
IV anticipates the legalistic setting. The periphrastic combination of uelle with the 
perfect infinitive (eripuisse) echoes the language of ancient laws. Ovid is fond of 
this legal idiom as Daube 1966 shows in his discussion of Amores I 4. Ovid’s Am. 
I 4,38 oscula praecipue nulla dedisse uelis «above all, you had better not wish to 
have given him any kisses» is the rather rare form of decree ne quis fecisse uelit. In 
other words, Ovid uses legal diction to describe Livor’s attempt to rob Venus of 
the etymological association of Aprilis with her name. 
But Venus reclaims the etymology of April in a way that refers to reclaiming sto-
len property. There is a clear reference to the manus iniectio in line 90. The manus 
iniectio occurs before the praetor in the uindicatio50. According to this legal ritual, 
a person who claimed that another was withholding their rightful property would 




seize the property and make a formal declaration that the res (‘chattel’) was his 
(see Gaius, Inst. 4.16; cf. Ulpian Digest. XI 7,14). This is what Venus does in order 
to seize the month of April from those who snatched it from her. It is remarka-
ble that what Venus claims here is not a res, but a nomen. Ovid’s legal procedure 
bridges the gap between the signifier and the signified. Note also that the legal 
drama of April’s etymology is followed by Ovid’s hymnic praise of Venus. In this 
hymn, the goddess is hailed as a universal legislator (Fasti IV 93-94). After she 
reclaims ownership of April in an act of uindicatio and trumps Livor’s attempt 
to dispossess her of her rightful property, she features as the sovereign legislator. 
Etymological debate is thus subjected to legal procedure. 
In other sources, the two etymological versions of Aprilis (from Aphrodite or 
from aperire) are sometimes quoted without the author making a judgment. Ver-
rius Flaccus, for instance, in his monumental Fasti Praenestini, mentions both 
(Degrassi, Inscr. It. XII 2,126-127): 
[Aprilis a] V[e]n[ere], quod ea [cum Anchisa iuxta mater fuit Aene]ae, regis 
[Latinor]um, a quo p(opulus) R(omanus) ortus e[st. Alii ab Ape]ri[li] q[uod]am 
i[n m]ense, quia fruges flores animaliaque ac maria ac terrae aperiuntur
Aprilis from Venus, because she mated with Anchises and became the 
mother of Aeneas, king of the Latins, from whom the Roman people origi-
nates. Others from Aperilis, because crops, flowers, and creatures, in the sea 
and on the earth alike, ‘spring’ (aperiuntur) in this month. 
Macrobius (Saturnalia I 12-13) attests that Cingius objected to the etymology of Ve-
nus from Aphrodite and calls those who offer this etymology ill-informed (inperite 
quosdam opinari). He argues that the Roman ancestors established not a single holy 
day nor any significant sacrifice to Venus in the course of this month. Macrobius 
adds that Varro agrees with Cingius51. In De lingua Latina, Varro first gives the et-
ymology of Aprilis from Aphrodite (LL VI 33 secundus mensis, ut Fuluius scribit et 
Iunius, a Venere, quod ea sit Aphrodite, «the second month, as Fulvius and Iunius 
write, from Venus, because she is Aphrodite»)52. But then he promptly rejects it 
for the alternative derivation from aperire (cuius nomen ego antiquis litteris quod 
nusquam inueni, magis puto dictum, quod uer omnia aperit, Aprilem, «but I have 
nowhere found her name in the old writings about the month, and so think that it 
51 See Fantham 1998, 101-102.




was called April rather because spring aperit ‘opens’ everything»)53. Interestingly, 
Ovid attacks Varro, putting him in the camp of Envy for his etymological reasoning. 
The sources that mention and discuss the etymologies of April often show a pref-
erence for one over the other. At times, there is a clear controversy (when Cingius, 
for instance, dismissed the proponents of the Greek etymology as ignorant). Ver-
rius Flaccus does not take sides – at least not clearly. He first gives the etymology 
of Aprilis from Aphrodite, but note how he supresses any reference to the Greek 
name and emphasizes the role of Venus as the ancestress of all Romans. Verrius 
Flaccus, a scholar in Augustus’ inner circle, foregrounds an etymology that would 
draw attention to the prince’s claim that his family descend from Venus. Etymology 
in the monumental work of the Fasti Praenestini is subtly, but clearly political. The 
Roman etymology of Aprilis from aperire is vaguely attributed to ‘others’ and given 
second place. Interestingly, Ovid gives a similar genealogical explanation to justify 
the Romanness of his Greek etymology (see Fasti IV 63-81). The poet then quotes 
the second etymology from aperire and rejects it. In this section of the Fasti, Ovid 
seems to be magnifying the structure and message of the Fasti Praenestini.
But what is missing in Varro, Verrius Flaccus or Macrobius is the legal dimen-
sion of this etymological dispute that features prominently in Ovid. How can we 
explain this? There are two ways. One way is to say that Ovid dramatizes etymo-
logical debate by turning it into legal action. Legalese and legal procedure are not 
unpoetic in Ovid. Quite the contrary, they add some courtroom drama to dry anti-
quarian pursuits. Livor first snatched April from Venus. Venus then reclaimed the 
month in a legal procedure and is subsequently hailed as a sovereign legislator in a 
hymn. We may interpret all this as an Ovidian innovation related to his fondness 
of adding legal colour to pursuits and situations that have ostensibly nothing to do 
with the law. But I think we can do better than this. In my view, the legal dimension 
of Ovidian etymologizing is not another glib witticism of an endlessly playful poet. 
Ovid points out that searching for the origins of words is something that concerns 
the law. He thus engages with the tradition of etymologizing in the schools of law, in 
legal procedure, and in the juristic interpretations of statutes in the age of Augustus.
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53 See De Melo 2019, 840. On Varro’s etymological procedure, see Taylor 1975; Blank 
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